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ABSTRACT
Recommendation is one of the critical applications that helps users
find information relevant to their interests. However, a malicious
attacker can infer users’ private information via recommendations.
Prior work obfuscates user-item data before sharing it with rec-
ommendation system. This approach does not explicitly address
the quality of recommendation while performing data obfuscation.
Moreover, it cannot protect users against private-attribute inference
attacks based on recommendations. This work is the first attempt
to build a Recommendation with Attribute Protection (RAP) model
which simultaneously recommends relevant items and counters
private-attribute inference attacks. The key idea of our approach
is to formulate this problem as an adversarial learning problem
with two main components: the private attribute inference attacker,
and the Bayesian personalized recommender. The attacker seeks to
infer users’ private-attribute information according to their items
list and recommendations. The recommender aims to extract users’
interests while employing the attacker to regularize the recommen-
dation process. Experiments show that the proposed model both
preserves the quality of recommendation service and protects users
against private-attribute inference attacks.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems→ Recommender systems; • Security
and privacy→ Social network security and privacy; Privacy
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recommendation systems play an important role in helping users
find relevant and reliable information that is of potential inter-
est [29]. These systems build profiles that represent user’s inter-
ests [8, 28] and recommend relevant items to the users based on the
constructed profiles [40]. Despite the effectiveness of recommenda-
tion systems, they can be sources of user privacy breach. Existing
work has shown that if malicious attackers have access to the sys-
tem’s output and unrestricted auxiliary information about their
targets, they are able to extract their entire user-item interactions
history [7, 12, 33, 39]. One main reason is that recommendation
systems’ outputs (i.e., product recommendation) are partially de-
rived from other users’ choices (i.e., user-item interactions history).
Thus, privacy concerns arise.
One of privacy issues is the re-identification attack where a mali-
cious adversary attempts to infer user’s actual ratings by seeking if
a target user is in the database [7]. Prior research on privacy preserv-
ing recommendation systems has extensively addressed this type of
privacy breach. Common techniques include (1) modifying the out-
put of the recommendation system algorithm so that the absence or
presence of a single rating or an entire user data is masked (i.e., dif-
ferential privacy based techniques) [23, 33, 45]; and (2) coarsening
the user’s interactions history by adding dummy items and ratings
such that the adversary cannot deduce the user’s actual ratings and
preferences (i.e., perturbation based techniques) [32, 38, 41].
Another privacy issue is the disclosure of user private-attribute
information through leaked users’ interactions history [11, 43].
Private attribute information contains those attributes that users
do not wish to disclose such as age, gender, occupation and loca-
tion. This type of privacy breach is known as the private-attribute
inference attack in which the adversary’s goal is to infer private
attributes of target users given their interactions history. Little has
been done to protect users against this attack of private-attribute
inference [10, 11, 24, 43] with focus on anonymizing user-item
data before publishing it. Data obfuscation comes at the cost of
utility loss where utility is defined as the quality of service users
receive. The existing work addresses the utility loss by minimizing
the amount of changes made to the data [24, 43]. However, in the
context of recommendation, the utility loss due to this approach can
lead to degraded recommendation results. Moreover, just sharing
perfectly obfuscated user-item data with a recommendation system
does not necessarily prevent the adversary from inferring users’
private information in future when they receive and accept new
recommendations (e.g., when purchasing new products).
This research aims to devise a mechanism to counter private-
attribute inference attacks in the context of recommendation sys-
tems. We propose a privacy-aware Recommender with Attribute
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Protection, namely RAP, which offers relevant products in a way
that makes any inference of user’s private attributes difficult from
his interactions history and recommendations. The proposed model
seeks to concurrently prevent the leakage of users’ private attribute
information while retaining high utility for users.
Recommendation while countering private-attribute inference
attack can be naturally formulated as a problem of adversarial
learning [19]. In our proposed RAP, there are two components: a
Bayesian personalized ranking recommender and a private-attribute
inference attacker (illustrated in Figure. 1). The private-attribute
inference attacker seeks to accurately infer users’ private attribute
information. The attacker aims to iteratively adapt its model with
respect to the existing recommender. The recommender extracts la-
tent representations of users and items for personalized recommen-
dation, and simultaneously utilizes the private-attribute inference
attacker to regularize the recommendation process by incorporating
necessary constraints to fool the attacker. Therefore, RAP optimizes
a composition of two conflicting objectives, modeled as a min-max
game between recommender and attacker components. Its objec-
tive is to recommend relevant, ranked items to users such that a
potential adversary cannot infer their private attribute information.
In essence, we investigate the following research issues: (1)
whether we can develop a personalized privacy-aware recommen-
dation system to guard against private-attribute inference attacks;
and (2) how we can ensure that the user’s private attributes are
effectively obscured after receiving personalized recommendation.
Our research on these issues results in a novel framework RAP
with the following main contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort in proposing
a recommendation system with guarding against the inference of
private attribute information while maintaining the user utility.
• The proposed RAP model uses an attacker component that reg-
ularizes the recommendation process to protect users against
private-attribute inference attack.
• The proposed RAP model is a general framework for recommen-
dation systems. Both of the integrated Bayesian personalized
recommender and the private-attribute attacker can be easily
replaced by different models designed for specific tasks.
• We conduct experiments on real-world data to demonstrate the
effectiveness of RAP. Our empirical results show that RAP pre-
serves user utility and privacy. The results demonstrates that
RAP outperforms the state-of-the-art related work and enables
an adjustable balance between private-attribute protection and
personalized recommendation.
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Before formally defining our problem, we first describe the nota-
tions used in this paper. Let I = {i1, ..., iM } denotes items, and
U = {u1, ...,uN } denotes users. Also, Ih represents the set of
items rated by user h, and Rh is set of items recommended to h.
P = {p1, ...,pT } denotes a set of T private attributes (e.g., age, gen-
der).R represents user-item ratingmatrix. The goal is to recommend
products to people that would be interesting for them. However,
we want to protect people’s privacy against a malicious adversary
who attempts to infer their private attribute information according
to the user’s list of items information. Items list Sh for each user
Figure 1: The architecture of Recommendation with Protec-
tion (RAP) with two components: a Bayesian personalized
recommender and a private-attribute inference attacker.
h is union of his previously rated and newly recommended items,
i.e., Sh = {Ih ∪ Rh }. In particular, the malicious attacker has a
framework which takes a target user’s interactions and infers the
user’s private attribute:
Problem 1. We aim to learn a function f that can recommend
interesting and relevant products Rh to each user uh such that, 1) the
adversary cannot infer the targeted user’s private attribute informa-
tion P from the user’s list of items information, Sh = {Ih ∪Rh } and
2) the set of recommended items Rh is interesting for the user. The
problem can be formally defined as: Rh = f (Ih ,R,P)
Note that, the goal is to protect users against a malicious adver-
sary who has access to the users’ items list, but not against the
recommender which is trusted.
3 RELATEDWORK
Explosive growth of the Web has raised numerous challenges for
online users including disinformation spread [1–4] and threats
to users’ privacy [7, 9]. Addressing user privacy issues has been
studied from different aspects such as textual information [10, 11],
web browsing histories [6], private-attributes disclosure [11, 24]
and recommendation systems [32, 45] (for a comprehensive survey
refer to [7]). Our work is related to a number of research which we
discuss below while we elaborate on the differences between our
work and them.
Privacy and Recommendation Systems. Existing privacy pre-
serving works in recommendation systems focus on protecting
users against re-identification attacks in which an adversary tries
to infer a targeted user’s actual ratings and investigate if the target is
in the database. They could be categorized into differential privacy
based [23, 26, 33, 45] and perturbation based [32, 38, 41] approaches.
Some methods utilize differential privacy strategy [14] to modify
the answers of the recommendation algorithm so the the presence
of a user’s data (either a single user-item rating or entire user’s his-
tory) is masked by increasing the chance that two arbitrary records
have close probabilities to generate the same noisy data. McSherry
et al. [33] utilize differential privacy to construct private covariance
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matrices to be further used by recommender. Another work [26]
clusters users w.r.t. the social relations and generates differentially
private average of users’ preferences in each cluster. Hua et al. [23]
propose a private matrix factorization which adds noise to item
vectors to make them differentially private. Bassily et al. [5] modify
user-item ratings data to satisfy differential privacy and then share
it with recommender. Another work [45] makes items list differ-
entially private and then sends it to recommender. Perturbation
based techniques obfuscate user’s interactions history by adding
fake items and ratings to it. Rebollo et al. [41] propose an informa-
tion theoretic based privacy metric and then find the obfuscation
rate for generating forged user profiles so that the privacy risk is
minimized. Similarly, [37] proposes to add or remove items and
ratings from user profiles minimize privacy risk. Polat et al. [38] use
a randomized perturbation technique by sharing disguised z-score
for items a given user have rated. In another work [32], similar
users are grouped to each other. Aggregated ratings of the users
within the same group is then used to estimate a group preference
vector. Similar to [38], randomness is then added to the preference
vector to be shared with the recommender.
Attribute Inference Attacks and Defenses Private-attribute in-
ference attack focuses on inferring users’ private attribute infor-
mation from their publicly available information. These attacks
could be categorized into three groups.A group of these attacks
leverages a target user’s friends’ information [18, 21, 31] and com-
munity membership information [34, 44] to infer target’s private
attributes. Second group of these attacks are those works which
leverage users’ behavioral information such as movie-rating be-
havior [43] and Facebook likes [30] to infer their private attribute
information. The third group of works exploits both friend and
behavioral information [16, 17, 25]. Gong et al. [16, 17] make a
social-behavior-attribute network in which all users’ behavioral
and friendship information is integrated in a unified framework.
Private attributes are then inferred through a vote distribution
attack model. Another work [25] incorporates structural and be-
havioral information from users who do not have the attribute in
the training process, i.e. negative training samples.
Little work focuses on protecting users against private-attribute
inference attacks [24, 43]. In [43], a predefined number of dummy
items is added to each user’s profile which are negatively correlated
with his actual attributes before publishing anonymized user-item
ratings data. In a recent paper [24], after a value is sampled for the
given private attribute w.r.t. a certain probability distribution which
is different from the user’s actual attribute, the minimum noise is
found and added to the user-item data via adapting evasion attacks
such that the malicious attacker predicts the sampled attribute value
as the user’s private attributes.
Our work is different from the existing works. First, existing pri-
vacy preserving recommendation systems do not specifically target
the private-attribute inference attacks. Second, existing defenses
against this attack [24, 43] address the utility loss by minimizing
the amount of changes made to the data. However, in scope of rec-
ommendation systems, this approach can mean neglecting the qual-
ity of received services, i.e., poor recommendation results. Third,
sharing anonymized data with recommender does not preclude the
malicious attacker to infer private attribute information when users
receive new recommendations. All of these limitations arises the
need for having a recommendation system guarding against the
inference of private attribute while maintaining the user utility.
4 RECOMMENDATIONWITH ATTRIBUTE
PROTECTION (RAP)
Our proposed recommendation framework, RAP, aims to concur-
rently recommend interesting items to users and protect them
against private attribute leakage. The entire model is illustrated in
Figure. 1. This framework consists of two major components, 1) a
Bayesian personalized recommender, and 2) a private-attribute in-
ference attacker. The personalized ranking recommender DR aims
to extract users’ actual preferences and recommend relevant items
to them. The private-attribute inference attacker DP seeks to de-
velop a model which can deduce users’ private information w.r.t.
the existing recommendation system. Recommendation component
then utilizes DP to guide the recommendation process by ensuring
that the union of previously rated and newly recommended items
does not leak user’s attributes and further fools the adversary inDP .
Inspired by adversarial machine learning, we model this objective
as a min-max game between two components, i.e. attackerDP seeks
to maximize its gain and recommender DR aims to minimize both
its recommendation loss and attacker DP ’s gain. The final output
of RAP for each user, is a list of top-K items which are interesting
yet safe for them.
4.1 Bayesian Personalized Recommendation
In this section, we propose a new Bayesian personalized recommen-
dation model. The proposed model structure is shown in Fig. 2. This
model first extracts users and items latent embeddings and then
utilizes learning to rank approach to recommend items to users.
Learning to rank methods have been introduced to optimize
recommendation systems toward personalized ranking. Inspired
by recent success of Bayesian Personalized Ranking (BPR) [42] in
image and friend recommendation systems [13, 35], we choose BPR
aver other approaches. The idea behind BPR is that observed user-
item interactions should be ranked higher than unobserved ones.
Learning from implicit feedback, BPR goal is to maximize the mar-
gin between an observed user-item interaction and its unobserved
counterparts. In particular, BPR behavior could be interpreted as
a classifier in which given a positive triplet instance of user h and
items j and k , (h, j,k), it determines whether the user-item interac-
tion (h, j) should have a higher rank score than (h,k).
This recomemndation component has three inputs, the user h
and items j and k .We denote the user and items indices by a tuple of
vectors (uh , i j , ik ) which are one-hot encodings of users and items.
Since there are N users andM items, the dimensions of uh , i j , and
ik are M , N and N , respectively. Following the input layer, each
input layer is fully connected to the corresponding embedding layer
to learn the latent representation of the users and items, qh ∈ Rd ,
pj ∈ Rd , where d is the number of dimensions. The embedding
dimensions for both users and items are the same:
qh = Whuh , pj = Wj i j , pk = Wk ik (1)
whereWh ,Wj andWk are embedding matrices for users and items.
In the next layer, user and item embedding vectors are passed to the
hidden layers Hh , Hj , and Hk for further calculations. For example,
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Figure 2: Overview of the Bayesian personalized recommen-
dation component.
the hidden layer produces Hh for user h as:
Hh = ReLU (wqh + bH ) (2)
where ReLU is simply defined as ReLU (x) = max(0,x) andw and
bH are the weights and bias for units, respectively.
Using Hh , Hj , and Hk , the next layer produces the user’s prefer-
ence yˆhj , yˆhk toward items j and k , respectively. For example:
yˆhj = ReLU (wo [Hh ;Hj ] + bo ) (3)
where bo is the bias parameter in the output layer. The activation
function is RelU function and [.; .] represents concatenation. Note
that due to the model simplicity, all users share the same latent
representation learning parameters {w,bH } and {wo ,bo } in the
hidden layer and output layer, respectively.
We use BPR to learn how to rank in the problem of recommen-
dation. The final objective function is to minimize the following
loss function w.r.t. θR :
LDR =
1
N
N∑
h=1
∑
(h, j,k )∈Dh
− lnδ ((yˆhj (θR )−yˆhk (θR )).д(h, j,k))+λθR ∥θR ∥2
(4)
where, д(h, j,k) is the ground truth value for our model training:
д(h, j,k) =
{
1, if user uh prefers item i j over item ik
−1, otherwise (5)
where set Dh = {(h, j,k)|j ∈ Ih and k ∈ I/ Ih } also denotes
the training pairwise instances in which I and Ih represent the
whole set of items and the set of items rated by user u, respec-
tively. Moreover, yhj is the actual rating that user h gives to item
j. θR is also defined as θR = {WU ,WI ,w,bH ,wo ,bo } such that
WU = {W1, ..,WN } andWI = {W1, ..,WM } represent the set
of embedding matrices for N users and M items, respectively. The
proposed model considers the recommendation problem as a bi-
nary classification problem to ensure that the pairwise preference
relations hold.
After training the recommendation model, given a user h, for
every item j that the user has not rated, i.e., j ∈ {I/ Ih }, his
preference score yˆhj is predicted by the recommender. In order
to calculate the preference score yˆhj , we pass the tuple (h, j, j)
Figure 3: Overview of the private-attribute inference at-
tacker component for one attribute.
to the recommender, and get yˆhj and yˆ′hj as the model’s output.
The final preference score of user h toward item j is calculated as
yˆhj = 0.5(yˆhj + yˆ′hj ). All of the unrated items will be then sorted
based on their preference scores descendingly and the top-K items
are then returned as the recommendation Rh to the user.
4.2 Training an Attacker against Inferring
Private Attribute Information
The goal of our model is to recommend ranked items to users such
that any potential adversary cannot infer users’ private attribute in-
formation such as age, gender and occupation. However, a challenge
is that the recommendation system does not know the malicious at-
tacker’s model. To address this challenge, we add a private-attribute
inference attackerDP component to our model which seeks to learn
a classifier that can accurately identify the private information of
users from their previous interactions. Then, we leverage this com-
ponent to regularize the recommendation process by incorporating
necessary constraints in order to fool the adversary DP and further
avoid the leakage of private attributes after recommendation. This
part is discussed in details in Section. 4.3.
The goal of the private-attribute attacker is now to predict target
user h’s private attribute information by leveraging the informa-
tion of his latent representation as well as the the latent represen-
tation of his items list. The user h’s items list Sh = {Ih ∪ Rh }
includes both items Ih that user has rated previously and new rec-
ommended items Rh . Given T private attributes (e.g., age, gender),
the set of {θP t }Tt=1 represents all the parameters included in the
private-attribute inference attacker component DP . The output
of the private attribute attacker component for user h w.r.t. t-th
private attribute is the probability that user h has t-th attribute.
We use ph,t to represent the actual value for user h’s t-th private
attribute. The structure of private attribute inference attacker is
represented in Fig.3. The input to this model for each user h is the
latent embedding representations of each item pj in his items list
pj ∈ Sh , j = 1, 2, ..., |Sh | and h’s latent embedding representation
qh . Given the input, the items embeddings are passed to a single-
layer recurrent neural network (RNN) and the output of RNN (z |Sh | )
is then concatenated with user’s embedding. The last layer produces
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the predicted t-th sensitive attribute for user h, pˆh,t :
pˆh,t = so f tmax(wt [z |Sh | ; qh ] + bt ) (6)
where [.; .] represents concatenation. Also,wt andbt are theweights
and bias for units, respectively and are shared among all users due
to the model simplicity. We then minimize the private-attribute
inference attacker component loss function LDtP for all private at-
tributes by seeking the optimal parameters {θ tP }Tt=1. The objective
function for all users can be formally written as follows:
LDP =
1
N
N∑
h=1
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
LDtP (pˆh,t ,ph,t )
]
(7)
where LDtP denotes the cross entropy loss for t-th private attribute.
4.3 Adversarial Learning for Recommendation
with Private-Attribute Protection
Thus far, we have discussed how we 1) learn users and items rep-
resentations to recommend ranked items to each user based on
his personalized preferences; and 2) train an attacker which can
accurately infer a target user’s private attribute information given a
list of his rated items and received recommendations. We stress that
the adversary always has the upper hand and adapts his private-
attribute inference attack in order to minimize his inference loss
w.r.t. the existing recommendation system. The final objective is
thus to recommend relevant ranked items to users such that a poten-
tial adversary cannot infer their private attribute information. To
achieve two goals together, we design an optimization problem to
minimize the recommendation loss of our model and maximize the
inference loss of a determined attacker who adaptively minimizes
his loss. Inspired by the idea of adversarial learning, we model
this optimization as a min-max game between two components,
Bayesian personalized recommender and private-attribute attacker.
In our proposed model, the adversary tries to adapt itself and
gets the maximum gain, while the recommendation system seeks
to recommend ranked items to users. The recommended items
not only align well with the users’ preferences, but also minimize
the adversary’s gain. We reformulate the objective function of the
recommendation system as minimizing attacker’s gain and recom-
mendation loss simultaneously:
min
θR
(
LDR
private-attribute attacker︷              ︸︸              ︷
−α max
{θ tP }Tt=1
LDP
)
︸                                       ︷︷                                       ︸
privacy-aware recommendation system
(8)
The inner part learns the most determined adversary which
adaptively minimizes its loss regarding private-attribute inference
given the users and items information. The outer part seeks to both
minimize the recommendation loss and fool the given adversary.
The parameter α controls the contribution of the private-attribute
inference attacker in the learning process. Objective function in
Algorithm 1 The Learning Process of RAP model
Input: Items setI, training user dataU, training user-itemmatrix
data R, batch size b, θR , {θ tP }Tt=1, α , λ and K .
Output: Trained recommendation with protection RAP.
1: repeat
2: Create amini-batchUb ofb users with their private-attribute
and item-rating information fromU
3: Train the recommendation with attribute protection via
Eq. 10 w.r.t. θR
4: For each user h in Ub , calculate the top-K recommended
items Rh
5: Train the private-attribute inference attacker DP (i.e.,
{θ tP }Tt=1) via Eq. 7 given the users’ information including
their list of items information, i.e., Sh = {Ih ∪ Rh }
6: until Convergence
Eq. 8 can be written as follows:
min
θR
max
{θ tP }Tt=1
(
1
N
N∑
h=1
[ ∑
(h, j,k)∈Dh
− lnδ ((yˆhj (θR ) − yˆhk (θR )).д(h, j,k))
(9)
− α
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
LDtP (pˆh,t ,ph,t )
] ]
+ λΩ(θ )
)
where θ = {θR , {θ tP }Tt=1} is the set of all parameters to be learned,
Ω(θ ) is the L2 norm regularizer on the parameters, and λ is a scalar
to control the contribution of the regularization Ω(θ ).
4.4 Optimization Algorithm
The optimization process is illustrated in Algorithm 1. First, we
create a mini-batch sample Ub of b users from the training data
and serve their private attribute and item-rating information to the
model. Next, we train the Bayesian personalized recommender DR
according to the Eq. 10 w.r.t. θR in Line 3. Then, for each user h in
Ub we calculate the top-K recommended items Rh and accordingly
make his list of items, Sh . The private-attribute inference attacker
component is then trained according to the users and item embed-
dings information using Eq. 7 in Line 5. After training RAP, for each
user h, a list of top-K items Rh will be returned as recommendation.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section we conduct experiments to evaluate the efficiency
of the proposed framework in terms of both privacy and quality of
the recommendation. We aim to answer the following questions:
• Q1 - Privacy: How does RAP perform in preventing leakage of
users’ private information?
• Q2 - Utility: How does RAP perform in recommending relevant
items to users?
• Q3 - Utility-Privacy Relation: Does the improvement in privacy
result in sacrificing the utility of recommendation system?
To answer the first question (Q1), we examine our model against
different private information with different distributions, such as
age, gender, and occupation. Then, we evaluate the effectiveness
of RAP in preventing leakage of users’ private information given
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union of users’ previously rated and newly recommended items.
Addressing leakage of private attribute information may result in
recommendation performance deterioration. Therefore, to answer
the second question (Q2), we examine the performance of RAP
in terms of the quality of the recommendation. Finally, to answer
the third question (Q3), we investigate the loss in recommendation
performance when enhancing privacy of users.
5.1 Data
We use publicly available data MovieLens [20]. This dataset in-
cludes 100, 000 ratings by 943 users on 1,682 movies. Each user
has rated at least 20 movies and the rating scores are between 1
and 5. In the collected dataset, each user is associated with three
private attributes, gender (male/female), age, and occupation. For
this paper, we follow the setting of [22] and categorize age attribute
into three groups, over-45, under-35, and between 35 and 45. In
total, 21 possible occupations have been considered for this data.
The average number of rated items for each user is 129.
5.2 Experimental Setting
Here, we first explain howwe design experiments to evaluate utility
and privacy. Then, we discuss evaluation metrics and baselines.
Implementation Details: The parameters for recommendation
and attacker components are determined through grid search. For
the Bayesian personalized ranking recommendation component,
we set the dimension of first layer as d = 70. Accordingly, size
of user and item embedding vectors is d = 70. The dimension of
hidden layer is also set as 20. For the private-attribute inference
attacker component, we use single layer RNNwith the dimension of
input layer set as d = 70. User and item embeddings are then passed
from recommendation component to the attacker component. The
dimension of hidden layer is set as 100. The parameters α and λ are
also determined through cross-validation, α = 1 and λ = 0.01.
We initialize the weight matrices in both components with ran-
dom values uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. The error gradient is
back propagated from output to input and parameters in each layer
are updated. The optimization algorithm used for gradient update
is Adam’s algorithm [27]. The loss generally converges after 20
epochs. The batch size we use in experiments is b = 32.
Recommendation Evaluation:We evaluate the performance of
recommendation by examining the quality of recommended items
for all users. We follow the setting of [24] to set-up the experimental
settings. To do so, we split the data for train and test as follows. For
each user h in the data, we randomly select l rated items for test
set and the remaining nh − l items for training set, where nh is the
number of rated items for user h. We set the item rating for those in
the test set as zero. We vary the value of l as {35, 40, 45}. Then, the
top-K items are then returned to each user as the recommendation.
Note that we assume RAP has access to the users’ private attribute
information during the training process.
Private-Attribute Evaluation: We evaluate privacy of users in
terms of their robustness against the malicious attribute inference
attacks in which the adversary’s goal is to infer users’ private
attributes. In particular, the malicious attacker learns a multi-class
classifier which takes a target user h list of items information, i.e.
Sh = {Ih ∪ Rh }, where Ih is set of h’s rated items and Rh is set
of items recommended to h. The adversary then infers the user’s
private attributes, i.e., gender, age, and occupation.
We use a Neural Network (NN)model as the adversary’s classifier.
Note that RAP is not aware of the adversary’s model. In this attack,
the adversary deploys a feed-forward network with a single hidden
layer to perform the attack. The input to this model is one-hot
encoding of each user, Sh = {Ih ∪ Rh }. Since there areM items in
the dataset, the dimension of input vector isM . The input layer is
then fully connected to the hidden layer with dimension of hidden
state set as 100 and a so f tmax layer used as the output layer. The
dimension of the hidden layer is determined through grid search.
We note that Gong et al. [36] also proposed an attribute inference
attack which leverages both social friends and rating behavior.
However, their attack is not applicable to our problem as we focus
on leveraging only user-item rating information.
We follow the setting of [24] to set-up the experiments. We
split the data to train and test sets by sampling 80% of the users
in the dataset uniformly at random as the training set and use the
remaining users as testing set. We assume that the users in the
training set has publicly disclosed their private information while
the users in the testing set keep those attribute information private.
Then, for each user in the test set, we randomly select l rated items
and remove them from the user’s rating history by setting the their
rating as zero.We keep the user-item ratings for users in the training
set intact (i.e., original user-item ratings). Trained RAP model is
deployed on the users in the test set and top-l recommended items
Rh are added to the users’ previously rated items Ih , in order to
make Sh = {Ih ∪ Rh }. We vary value of l as {35, 40, 45}.
The adversary’s classifier is trained on the training set and eval-
uated on the users in the test set. Note that we assume that the
malicious attacker knows the original intact user-item interactions
for those users in the training set and seeks to predict private at-
tribute information of the users in the test set, given their Sh . We
evaluate a malicious attack for each private attribute.
Evaluation Metrics:We use the following metrics for evaluating
RAP performance w.r.t. malicious private-attribute inference (i.e.,
privacy) and product recommendation (i.e., utility):
• Private-Attribute Evaluation: Since distribution of data for
different private attribute values is imbalance, we report micro-
AUC [15] of the adversary’s classifier. Micro-AUC [15] gives
a more accurate assessment. Lower AUC demonstrates higher
privacy in terms of obscuring private attributes.
• Recommendation Evaluation:We use standard metrics that
are widely used in other related works [46], i.e., P@K and R@K .
P@K : P@K represents the ratio of test cases which has been
successfully recommended in a top-K position in a ranking list
to value of K . For each user, we measure P@K as:
P@K = |{test items} ∩ {top-K returned items}|
K
(10)
R@K : R@K defines the ratio of top-K recommended items which
are in the test set to the number of items to be recommended in
the test. For each user in the data, we measure R@K as follows:
R@K = |{test items} ∩ {top-K returned items}||{test items}| (11)
We then report the average of R@K and P@K for all users in the
dataset and set the number of returned items as K = 35.
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Model # test items (l )35 40 45
Gen Age Occ P@K R@K Gen Age Occ P@K R@K Gen Age Occ P@K R@K
Original 0.7662 0.7050 0.8332 0.156 0.156 0.7662 0.7050 0.8332 0.151 0.172 0.7662 0.7050 0.8332 0.145 0.187
LDP-SH 0.6587 0.6875 0.8076 0.071 0.071 0.6440 0.6777 0.7954 0.062 0.078 0.6398 0.6732 0.7817 0.055 0.081
BlurMe 0.6266 0.6177 0.7614 0.118 0.118 0.6013 0.5949 0.7589 0.109 0.134 0.5884 0.5901 0.7522 0.099 0.150
RAP 0.6039 0.5397 0.7319 0.152 0.152 0.5714 0.5270 0.7315 0.147 0.168 0.5278 0.5262 0.7312 0.142 0.183
Table 1: RAP Performance. Higher P@K and R@K values show higher utility, while lower AUC indicates higher privacy.
BaselineMethods:We compare RAPwith the following baselines:
• Original: This baseline is a variant of RAP which recommends
items for each user without incorporating the private-attribute
inference attacker component, i.e., α = 0.
• LDP-SH [5]: This method adds noise to user-item ratings based
on ϵ-differential privacy. It requires categorical data which for
our case, each user-item rating can be viewed as categorical data
taking values {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}.
• BlurMe [43]: This method perturbs user-item ratings before
sending to recommendation system. It adds new items to each
user’s profile that are negatively correlated with the user’s actual
private attributes and then adds the average rating score to those
items. BlurMe needs to be deployed for each attribute separately.
To have a fair comparison between RAP and two baselines, we
anonymze the user-item rating data w.r.t. baselines. The noisy ma-
nipulated data is used to train the recommendation model. We use
matrix factorization model as the recommendation framework for
both baselines. The discussed procedure is then used for evaluation.
5.3 Privacy Analysis (Q1)
The results against the malicious private-attribute inference attack
(Section 5.2) are demonstrated in Table. 1. We observe that increas-
ing the number of test items (l) results in decrease of AUC score
for all frameworks. This is because for each target user h in the test
set, l recommended items Rh have been added to user’s item list
Sh . Therefore, increase of l can decrease the malicious attacker’s
chance for correctly inferring users’ private attribute information.
Moreover, RAP has significantly lower AUC score in comparison
to Original for all three private attributes and thus outperforms
Original in terms of obscuring users’ private attribute information.
RAP also has significantly better performance in hiding private in-
formation in comparison to LDB-SH. The reason is that LDB-SH
aims to achieve a privacy goal that is different from preventing
leakage of private information. This confirms that although adding
noise and satisfying ϵ-differential privacy can indirectly benefit
private attribute leakage, it does not directly target this problem.
These results show the importance of private-attribute inference
attacker component in obfuscating private information. We also ob-
serve that RAP hides more private information rather than BlurMe
(lower AUC score). This demonstrates that providing obfuscated
user-item rating data to the recommendation system, does not nec-
essarily guarantee preventing future private attribute leakage when
user receives (and accordingly buy) more recommended products.
Moreover, BlurMe needs to be deployed for each private attribute
separately while RAP considers three private attributes all together.
These results confirm the efficiency of RAP in obscuring users’
private attribute information and demonstrate that despite the fact
that RAP is not aware of the adversary’s inference model, it is
prepared against the malicious attacker.
5.4 Utility Analysis (Q2)
The results for recommendation task for different methods and
different number of test items (l ) are shown in Table. 1. We observe
that increasing the number of test items (l) results in increasing
R@K and decreasing P@K for all methods. Note that the higher
the P@K and R@K score values are, the higher recommendation
quality is. Another observation is that LDP-SH has the worst per-
formance amongst all methods, i.e., lowest P@K and R@K scores.
This is because of the way LDP-SH adds noise to the user data with-
out considering the quality of recommendation service in practice
which can result in degraded recommendation results. BlurMe
has also lower performance than RAP as it neglects quality of rec-
ommendation results. These results confirm the effectiveness of
Bayesian personalized recommendation component which helps
RAP to take the utility into consideration in practice. Moreover,
quality of recommendation results for RAP method is comparable
to the Original approach. This means that RAP can accurately
capture users’ actual preferences and interests (i.e., high utility).
The results confirm the effectiveness of RAP in understanding
users’ actual preferences and recommending ranked relevant prod-
ucts that are interesting yet safe products to users.
5.5 Utility-Privacy Relation (Q3)
We compare the privacy and utility results in Table. 1 for all meth-
ods. We observe that LDP-SH has the worst results in terms of both
preserving privacy and recommendation performance. Another
observation is that BlurMe improves privacy compared to the
Original method, but it loses utility in terms of recommendation
system performance. This is in contrast with the results of RAP,
which has outperformed BlurMe and LDP-SH in terms of recom-
mendation and has comparable results with Original. RAP has
also achieved the lowest AUC score and therefore highest privacy
among all other methods. Comparing RAP with other methods
confirms that approaching utility loss by minimizing the amount of
data changes results in loss of quality of recommendation system
in practice. This is reflected as degraded recommendation results
for baseline approaches. Moreover, these results confirm the ef-
fectiveness of Bayesian personalized recommendation component
in RAP, which helps us to consider quality of recommendation in
practice. Results also demonstrate the complementary roles of both
WSDM ’20, February 3–7, 2020, Houston, TX, USA G. Beigi et al.
Model # test items (l )35 40 45
Gen Age Occ P@K R@K Gen Age Occ P@K R@K Gen Age Occ P@K R@K
RAP 0.6039 0.5397 0.7319 0.152 0.152 0.5714 0.5270 0.7315 0.147 0.168 0.5278 0.5262 0.7312 0.142 0.183
RAPAge 0.6450 0.5948 0.7528 0.150 0.150 0.5489 0.5938 0.7522 0.146 0.167 0.5475 0.5909 0.7497 0.141 0.182
RAPGen 0.5332 0.6789 0.7558 0.151 0.151 0.5298 0.6614 0.7556 0.145 0.166 0.5211 0.6415 0.7555 0.141 0.181
RAPOcc 0.6571 0.6949 0.7468 0.147 0.147 0.6485 0.6871 0.7466 0.141 0.161 0.6454 0.6853 0.7438 0.135 0.174
Table 2: Impact of different private-attribute attacker components on RAP in terms of utility and privacy.
(a) Attribute Age (b) Attribute Gender (c) Attribute Occupation (d) Recommendation
Figure 4: Performance results for private-attribute inference attack and recommendation task for different values of α
recommendation and private attribute components which guide
each other through both privacy and utility issues. This results in a
privacy-aware recommendation system which is prepared for pri-
vate attribute inference attack and understands users’ preferences.
5.6 Impact of Different Components
Here, we investigate the impact of different private attribute com-
ponents on obscuring users’ private information. We define three
variants of our proposed framework, i.e., RAPAge, RAPGen, and
RAPOcc. In each of these variants, the model is trained with the cor-
responding private-attribute inference attacker component, e.g. RA-
PAge is trained solely with age inference attacker component and
does not utilize any other private-attribute attackers during train-
ing phase. Results are shown in Table. 2. We observe that for gender
attribute, RAPGen has the best performance in terms of obscuring
gender attribute comparing to the other approaches (i.e., lowest
AUC score). This is in contrast to quality of RAPGen performance
for recommendation task which is lower than original proposed
model RAP. For other private attributes, RAP still outperforms
RAPOcc and RAPAge in terms of obscuring age and occupation
attributes. Moreover, results show that using one private-attribute
attacker compromises the effectiveness model for obfuscating other
private attributes. For the recommendation task, we surprisingly
observe that using solely one of the private-attribute attackers in
training process can result in performance reduction in compari-
son to RAP in terms of P@K and R@K . This means that focusing
merely on obscuring one private attribute can result in more rec-
ommendation performance degradation.
5.7 Probing Further
RAP has one important parameterα which controls the contribution
from private-attribute attacker component. In this section, we probe
further to investigate the effect of this parameter by varying it as
{0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. For this experiment, we set the number of test
items l = 35. We also set the number of top-K returned items as
K = 35 for calculating P@K . Note that P@K and R@K are equal
in this scenario as K = l = 35. Results are shown in the Fig. 4.
Although α controls the contribution of private-attribute in-
ference attacker component, we surprisingly observe that with
the increase of α , the AUC score for attribute inference attack de-
creases at first up to the point that α = 0.5 and then it increases.
This means that private information were obscured more accurately
at the beginning with the increase of α and less later. Moreover,
with the increase of α , the performance of recommendation task
decreases, i.e., lower P@K . This shows that increasing the contri-
bution of private-attribute attacker component leads to decrease in
the quality of recommendation framework. Another observation
is that setting α = 0.25 leads to improvement in hiding private at-
tribute information in comparison to the results of using Original
(or when α = 0). This result shows the importance of the RAP’s
private-attribute attacker component in preserving privacy of users.
Another observation is that after α = 0.5, continuously increasing α
increases the AUC for malicious private-attribute inference attack,
i.e., degrades the performance of hiding private information. The
reason is that the model could overfit by increasing the value of α
and lead to an inaccurate estimation of privacy protection.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an adversarial learning-based recommen-
dation with attribute protection model, RAP, which guards users
against private-attribute inference attack while maintaining utility.
RAP recommends interesting yet safe products to users such that a
malicious attacker cannot infer their private attribute from users’
interactions history and recommendations. RAP has two main com-
ponents, Bayesian personalized recommender, and private-attribute
inference attacker. Our empirical results show the effectiveness of
RAP in both protecting users against private-attribute inference
attacks and preserving quality of recommendation results. RAP also
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consistently achieves better performance compared to the state-of-
the-art related work. One extension to this work is to study the
possibility of extending differential privacy mechanism for this
type of attack in recommender systems. It would be also interesting
to investigate personalized utility-privacy trade-off by tweaking
framework parameters to fit the specific needs of individuals.
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